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Abstract 
The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes of Canterbury have had a serious and ongoing effect on Maori 
in the city (Lambert, Mark-Shadbolt, Ataria, & Black, 2012). Many people had to rely on them-
selves, their neighbours and their whanau for an extended period in 2011, and some are still 
required to organise and coordinate various activities such as schooling, health care, work and 
community activities such as church, sports and recreation in a city beset by ongoing disruption 
and distress. Throughout the phases of response and recovery, issues of leadership have been 
implicitly and explicitly woven through both formal and informal investigations and debates. 
This paper presents the results of a small sample of initial interviews of Maori undertaken in 
the response and early recovery period of the disaster and discusses some of the implications for 
Maori urban communities. 
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Introduction 
The tragic events of 22 February 2011 have 
become a part of the history of Aotearoa New 
Zealand. In the seconds during, and min-
utes after, the shallow 6.3 magnitude shock, 
countless individuals acted across the city of 
Christchurch Otautahi with great courage 
wherever they found themselves, whether 
inside collapsed buildings or in the streets where 
many people were injured or killed by falling 
masonry. Emergency workers were quickly on 
the scene. Two companies of soldiers exercising 
near Christchurch joined two urban search and 
rescue (USAR) teams (from Auckland and New 
Plymouth), complementing the local USAR 
team, fire officers, paramedics, police officers 
and ambulance staff. Other emergency work-
ers arrived from around the country, and triage 
and welfare centres were quickly established. 
A 73-strong search and rescue team arrived 
from New South Wales, Australia, on the day 
of the quake and were operating the next day; 
other international rescue crews arrived from 
Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. At the end of the first 
week, 330 Australian police had been sworn 
in, contributing to the 1,200 New Zealand 
police on patrol and active duty (New Zealand 
Police, 2011). Services and infrastructure were 
obviously badly affected, but the airport was 
operational for emergency flights within 4 hours 
and commercial flights within 24 hours. 
In this context, leadership was fundamental 
to the survival and security of tens of thou-
sands of people. However, leadership itself sits 
within, and interacts with, a number of other 
spheres, such as communication, situational 
awareness, teamwork, and stress and fatigue 
management (Vallance, 2012), and it operates 
at various scales. Further, the performance 
of a range of formal and informal leaders is 
an emotional topic and has elicited ongoing 
passionate debate, such as is revealed by the 
second internal review of the performance 
of regional commanders in the Fire Service, 
accused of serious failings in their leadership 
(New Zealand Fire Service, 2012; Tobin, 2011). 
Leaders of the "Farmy Army" and Student 
Volunteer Army complained of a lack of coop-
eration from officials and have since identified 
the empowerment of volunteers as being an 
important lesson leaders should learn from 
the recovery process (Hartnell, 2012). For the 
people of Christchurch, there has been a lack of 
transparency and confusion over roles between 
the council and government leadership. 
The recovery phase is recognised as vital 
in emergency management and civil defence 
operations that seek long-term community 
resilience (Beckett, Wilkinson, & Potangaroa, 
2010). So-called soft leadership is combined 
with technical management to frame effective 
post-disaster recovery, targeted towards achiev-
ing the right actions with minimal delay. While 
accepting that a disaster is, by definition, charac-
terised by the general and extensive breakdown 
of systems, what follows is a snapshot of the 
words and experiences of 10 Maori leaders and 
managers through an urban disaster. 
Maori leadership 
The immediate response 
While the 4 September 2010 quake was larger 
than the 22 February 2011 event (magnitude 
7.1 versus 6.3), it struck early in the morning 
(about 4:30 am) and, while there was consider-
able disruption to the city, there were no deaths. 
The February quake occurred at 12:51 pm and 
immediately placed thousands of people in life 
and death situations, as was the case, for exam-
ple, for one of our respondents in the Central 
Business District (CBD): 
When I evacuated the office, my work colleague 
who was pregnant needed help ... As I was 
walking past Joe's Garage, I could hear scream-
ing in there. I helped this one lady out, I ended 
up carrying her. Both her legs were crushed. 
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Another interviewee was a team leader for 
USAR who spent many hours in the wreck-
age of a collapsed building, where one of his 
tasks was to help amputate a trapped man's 
legs, using a hacksaw and a Leatherman tool. 
A Maori policeman was naked in the show-
ers in the police building and, after dressing, 
walked out into the CBD as a first responder, 
not knowing whether or not his only child was 
safe for 5 hours. 
Many Maori managers found themselves in 
the terrible situation of fearing for their own 
lives and the lives of their staff: "Oh, I didn't 
have time to be affected by the EQ ... on the 
day we were in the CBD, I was more worried 
about my entire team dying in front of my eyes 
actually." 
All those who were parents experienced har-
rowing delays in getting to their children; one 
mother waited 11 hours until she knew her 
"baby" (actually an adult male but the emo-
tional ties remain, of course) was alive and safe. 
The first few days 
Strong views were expressed on the actions 
of leaders in the days following the February 
event. Several interviewees were disparaging 
about Maori leadership. At an early hui called 
to discuss the Maori response, it was described 
by one wahine as a display of "peacocking" by 
some Maori men. 
A Kaiimatua, probably Ngai Tahu, should 
I mean they follow protocol and all the rest 
but you don't see somebody that's like look, 
should we have a bit of a, shall we have a, urn, 
let's go outside and connect with nature and 
discuss the thing, you know, the blah blah, and 
then we'll go back and we'll dah dah dah. It's 
like right we're doing this, bang! 
Interestingly, two of our interviewees returned 
to damaged buildings to collect laptops that con-
tained databases and contact details necessary 
for their work. While this is counter to advice and 
even actual commands, it is an example of how 
many people acted in ways counter to "stand-
ard" procedures (which were reinforced by the 
first, non-fatal, earthquake of 4 September). 
When people could retrieve items considered 
necessary for their work, they did so. When they 
could not, or were prevented from doing so, con-
siderable business disruption followed. 
The role of tikanga was also an important 
theme, with some seeing aspects of Maori cul-
tural practices adhered to beyond the point of 
utility: 
The practicality of tikanga goes like this: any 
kaiimatua will tell you if it's not working, if 
it's impractical, we're not doing it! They'll tell 
you where it's not the very best to be bloody 
hongi-ing people when there's a pandemic on 
and they'll say well actually we won't have big 
gatherings because actually everyone will get 
sick. The kaiimatua know. 
have been [in charge] ... it takes away all the Kaiimatua were seen as having important roles, 
power from the little power piggies you know sometimes in just reassuring others. One kaii-
this is Ngai Tahu's responsibilities in terms of matua, whose house and neighbourhood were 
how we feel about our responsibilities towards badly damaged, drew positive comparisons 
manaakitanga this is what we're doing. with his younger years of rural poverty, using 
The style of leadership, and organisational 
structures, came in for sustained criticism from 
some: 
You never see a command post that's run by a 
consensual stylist. [It] doesn't work that way. 
humour, which was seen as being important: 
I think one of the things we do well is humour 
... there's a bit of resilience that comes with 
that. That approach, there's a bit of integrity 
there. Doesn't seem like leadership but it gave 
me strength at the time! 
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The following weeks and months 
As aftershocks continued to rock the city, 
the stress and frustration increased for many 
people. Data on school enrolments show that 
Maori children moved schools, primarily out 
of Canterbury, at three to five times the rate of 
Pakeha (Lambert, Mark-Shadbolt, Ataria, & 
Black, 2012). As Maori providers and workers 
increased their presence and activities, various 
conflicts were evident, notably the need for 
official reports and data from head offices and 
government versus the demand for people on 
the ground who could doorknock and sit with 
frightened and disconnected people - Maori 
and non-Maori. 
The recovery phase is now dominated by 
larger institutions - many of them offshore 
- that are injecting capital for the rebuild, a 
phase that is not the subject of this paper but is 
framed by serious difficulties in trying to secure 
and allocate financial capital. Capital flight is 
being recorded as developers receive insurance 
pay-outs and reinvest elsewhere in the country. 
Future Maori leaders 
Leadership studies has developed as an increas-
ingly important topic and strategy focus for the 
New Zealand public and private sector (see, e.g., 
Curtin, 2008), and for Maori (Mead, Stevens, 
Third, Jackson, & Pfeifer, 2006; Katene, 2010). 
The development of Maori leaders - for current 
and future challenges - was seen as important 
by our respondents: 
I think we don't have enough skill in lots of 
do this and we're doing that" ... that's what 
I mean about leadership. 
You need the emergence of strong leaders 
[who] can say "cut the crap, let's go!" 
Broader organisational context 
It is important to realise that much Maori lead-
ership in the aftermath took place within a 
complex and often confused organisational 
context that was itself seriously impacted by 
the disaster: the Maori response could only 
be "nested" within a wider response. Several 
respondents noted the political landscape: 
It's like of course the CBD is to protect the 
CBD first and foremost, and that's the city I 
guess, that's what it looked like. But then there 
were areas where it's almost like the rich get 
richer the poor get poorer, it was the same sce-
nario. "The poor, oh we can hold them off", 
it almost looked like it came down to money. 
I think this whole thing was a political thing. 
It's about who controls Christchurch. 
Various initiatives are under way. Educational 
institutions in the city are required to investigate 
how they can work together; a strong initiative 
comes from Te Tapuae 0 Rehua, who are coor-
dinating a trades training programme that aims 
to upskill200 Maori trainees for the rebuilding 
of the city (Tarena, 2012). 
areas ... it's about work force development Discussion 
and also succession. 
I'm talking about people who can get things 
done, motivate people, give the whanau the 
sense of confidence that they need. [Someone] 
should have been up there and saying "now 
this is what we're doing, and we're going to 
As noted, a disaster is characterised by the 
extensive breakdown of systems, including 
communications, which severely challenges 
leadership. Power cuts and damaged infra-
structure meant contacting staff, colleagues and 
whanau was difficult and sometimes impossible. 
245 
246 S, LAMBERT & M. MARK-SHADBOLT 
Also, many nominated leaders were themselves 
in damaged homes and subject to sleepless 
nights as the city was regularly shaken by many 
thousands of aftershocks. That individual first 
responders turn up at all is not guaranteed: 
up to 20% have been found to be technically 
derelict in their duties in some disasters, while 
many of these were actually searching for their 
own family members and securing their safety 
first (Linsdell, 2012). 
For Maori leadership, wider governmental 
and non-governmental organisational struc-
tures often trumped Maori aspirations. Local 
officials struggled to balance issues of safety, 
planning regulations, and the need to engage 
stakeholders in the recovery of the CBD to aid 
businesses and mitigate direct and indirect costs 
of a prolonged closure. 
Of course, the debate over the role of local 
and national government has been a fundamen-
tal challenge in other emergencies and disasters. 
The Pike River mining disaster (which occurred 
19 November 2010, i.e., between the first quake 
of 4 September 2010 and the major quake of 
22 February 2011) saw controversy over the 
performance of the police, who assumed the 
main role in the ultimately unsuccessful and 
possibly futile rescue attempts. Who, exactly, 
should be in charge of disasters? 
In Christchurch, new and additional authori-
ties were established, such as the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), and 
reinsurers add layers of complexity to the recov-
ery period, causing considerable distress and 
anger. While additional agencies are probably 
needed, given the scale of the disaster, their 
role and relationship with local bodies must 
be clear and this is a role for the highest levels 
of government leadership. As the wider New 
Zealand economy has stalled, the social and 
financial pressures on Maori affected by the 
earthquakes look set to worsen. 
Conclusions 
Leadership needed during the disaster experi-
enced by Christchurch Otautahi can be split 
into two phases, correlating with the phases 
of response and recovery. Each phase requires 
different skills, with courage, initiative, and 
personal training and skills dominating the first 
phase; and networking, collaboration and pro-
fessional managerial skills framing needs in the 
second phase. Fitting Maori communities for 
future disasters needs to concentrate on clarify-
ing how Maori response(s) coordinate among 
Maori, and work in within the wider and pre-
dominant non-Maori response. The vulnera bility 
of Maori to future disasters through ongoing 
economic marginalisation cannot be overstated. 
Although this paper did examine the existing 
recovery phase, it is clear this is not progress-
ing well for the city in general: the effects on 
Maori can only be negative. Improving how 
top-down approaches (emanating from central 
government) hybridise with localised bottom-
up efforts will enable Maori to benefit from 
and contribute to the recovery of the city of 
Otautahi. 
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